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Summary
The build-up of the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) constitutes one of the main pillars of NATO’s official 
exit strategy from Afghanistan. This policy brief presents 
an overview of the Norwegian Army’s experience from 
working with the Afghan Nation Army (ANA) in Opera-
tional Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT). As partnering 
and mentoring are seen as complementary activities, the 
policy brief recommends that OMLT contributions should 
be gradually transformed and oriented towards the higher 
strategic level of the ANA, in conjunction with the broader 
NATO drawdown. It further recommends that the Norwe-
gian government continue with its OMLT commitment in 
parallel to its regular military presence, and that consid-
eration be given to prolonged collaboration with the ANA 
also beyond 2014.  
Norwegian military personnel have contributed to the 
ANA since 2006, first as mentors to the Brigade leadership, 
and from 2009/2010 as mentors to an Afghan battalion or 
Kandak. The overall impression from the returning per-
sonnel interviewed for this study is that the performance 
of the ANA units under Norwegian tutorage has improved 
considerably since the OMLT startup. However, the ANA’s 
performance cannot be seen in isolation from the over-
arching state-building project underway in Afghanistan, 
so there is considerable reason to worry about the sustain-
ability of the security forces currently being built up.
Context
This policy brief is based on the NUPI report Etter beste 
evne – om Forsvaret og deres afghanske partnere (2012). A 
seminar with personnel returning from the OMLT Bri­
gade and OMLT Kandak conducted at NUPI on 10 No­
vember 2011 constitutes the main empirical foundation 
of the report. Mentoring activities performed by the 
Norwegian Special Forces are not included in this study. 
Various bilateral and multilateral arrangements for 
defense and police reform have coexisted since 2002, 
leading to fragmentation in the organization of inter­
natio nal assistance to security sector reform.1 IN 
2006, the US Office of Military Cooperation – Afgha­
ni stan was renamed the Combined Security Transi­
tion Command – Afghanistan (CSTC­A). In parallel 
with the merging of the American Operation Endur­
ing Freedom and ISAF under a common command, 
train ing activities in 2009 became jointly coordinated 
between the CSTC­A and the NATO Training Mission 
– Afghanistan (NTM­A). The CSTC­A and NMT­A, 
how ever, formally remained separate operations with 
dif ering mandates. Main responsibility for the police 
re form was transferred to the EU with the start­up 
of the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in 
2007.2 The Norwegian Army has supported the ANA 
since 2006, first as mentors to the Brigade leader­
ship at ANA 209th Corps, and from 2009/2010 as 
men tors to an Afghan battalion (Kandak). Moreover, 
Norway has been involved bilaterally and multilater­
1 The original division of responsibility was as follows: USA 
– military reform; Germany – police reform; Italy – justice 
reform; Japan – demobilization of former combatants; UK – 
counter­narcotics.
2 The Afghan intelligence National Directorate of Security does 
not formally have a mentor state, but has been working closely 
with the USA and other major state donors since 2001.
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al ly in police reform in Afghanistan since 2005, and 
was also involved in justice reform until 2008/09.3
NATO OMLT concept
The conceptual foundation for the Operational Mentor­
ing and Liaison Teams (OMLT) is found in the SHAPE 
(Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) OMLT 
Concept of Operations. The OMLTs are to focus on op­
erational eforts, primarily through integrated mentor 
teams.4 The main objective is to strengthen the ANA 
and ensure that it is capable of independently handling 
the security situation in Afghanistan. The OMLT con­
cept can be divided into four specialized missions:  In 
accordance with NATO’s plans, OMLTs are to (1) guide, 
train, advise and mentor units from the ANA; (2) sup­
port and advise the ANA in planning and implement­
ing security operations; (3) operate as liaison between 
ISAF regional commands, and implement and coordi­
nate joint activities between the ANA and ISAF; and (4) 
par ticipate in the operations of ANA units, also those 
outside the originally assigned region of operation.5
The  SHAPE  OMLT  Concept  of  Operations  recomm ends 
that brigade and battalion OMLT units should consist 
of around 20 mentors, plus support units. In practice, 
however, troop­contributing countries have organized 
their OMLT contributions in various ways. Some keep 
them organizationally separate from other divisions, 
whereas others link their mentoring units to regular 
combat divisions on the company and battalion level.6 
Norway’s first OMLT Kandak contingent was estab­
lished in 2009, with 47 personnel. Force multipliers 
were included to enhance ANA capacity directly. This 
arrangement has remained relatively constant for the 
two subsequent OMLT Kandaks, as well as for the hy­
brid OMLT Mentoring Unit deployed in 2010/2011 to 
perform ad hoc mentoring of brigade support units. 
The size of the Norwegian/Swedish/Finnish OMLT 
Brigade has varied. Contingent 1/2011 consisted of 8 
mentors: two Norwegian, four Swedish and two Finn­
ish. The support unit consisted of 17 personnel. The 
OMLT Brigade unit was relocated from Mazar­e­Sharif 
to Faryab in 2010. Lack of specific expertise within the 
fields of medicine, engineering and military intelli­
gence has remained a challenge, and the relocation 
can explain this situation only partially. According 
to our interviewees, some of the coordination prob­
lems could be ascribed to the three­nation model it­
self. The consensus was nonetheless that contingent 
1/2011 had made positive contributions to the ANA. 
The Norwegian Army’s OMLT experiences 
When the OMLT concept was introduced in Afghani­
stan in 2006, it was new to the Norwegian Army. Our 
interviewees expressed satisfaction with the training 
and program developed by Hærens Våpenskole (run by 
the Norwegian Army) and NATO. However, the contin­
gent leader’s de facto responsibility for identifying can­
didates for the positions in the OMLT Kandak unit was 
perceived a burden that necessitated a six­month set­
up period. Stronger support from the Armed Forces’ 
central personnel management group (Forsvarets sent-
rale personellforvaltning) might, according to the OMLT 
officers interviewed, shorten this period without re­
ducing the strength of the OMLT. The set­up period 
was, however, considered important for bringing the 
military and physical skills of the personnel up to par.
The OMLT personnel evaluated their personal expe­
rience as positive on the whole. Combat experience, 
the testing of professional and mental abilities, and 
experience from working in a diferent culture and 
context were highlighted as valuable professional 
experiences they had gained. Interviewees difered 
in their evaluation of the long­term sustainability of 
the assistance to the ANA, however. This generally 
reflected the ANA level where they had been work­
ing (brigade or battalion) and whether they were as­
sessing ANA performance separately or as part of 
‘the bigger picture’ of developments in Afghanistan. 
The Norwegian approach
Mentoring and partnering are complementary activi­
ties. According to interviewees, active military partici­
pation creates trust and a sense of team identity which 
amplifies the efect of instruction. The disadvantage 
of the partnering approach, on the other hand, is that 
the ANA has come to rely heavily on operational sup­
port from the OMLTs and other ISAF resources, par­
ticularly for air support, logistics and medical evacua­
tion. International assistance has created dependency, 
and to some degree making it more difficult for the 
ANA to become self­reliant. To counter this tenden­
cy, OMLT Kandak IV has deliberately pressed for 
increased Afghan ownership and operational lead. 
OMLT officers experienced sharing a professional plat­
form with their Afghan colleagues, and described this 
as a relationship founded on mutual respect. Interview­
ees emphasized the relatively non­hierarchical nature 
of the Norwegian Army as a major advantage for their 
relations with Afghan colleagues during the partner­
ing and mentoring activities, in contrast to the more 
hierarchical structure of, for instance, the US Army.7 
OMLT officers underscored that mentoring and advis­
3 Halvor Hartz (2009), Samarbeid eller samrøre? NUPI­notat 
764, http://www.nupi.no/content/download/10557/105681/ver­
sion/5/file/WP­764­Hartz.pdf, and Marina Caparini, Kari Marie 
Kjellstad and Trine Nikolaisen (2011), A Stocktaking of Norwegian 
Engagement in Security Sector Reform. Security in practice No. 11, 
2011, http://www.nupi.no/content/download/201598/728370/
version/4/file/SIP11­Caparini+et+al­NUPI+Report.pdf,  both 
from the Norwegian Institute of International Afairs (NUPI).
4 Svend Arne Hokstad, speech at Oslo Militære Samfund 
(15 February 2010). http://www.oslomilsamfund.no/oms_
arkiv/2010/2010­02­15_Hokstad.html
5 Ibid.
6 Information provided by Lieutenant Colonel Johan Nygård, 21 
December 2011.
7 See also Ola Krekvik (2011). Forsvarets samvirke med afghanske 
styrker. Oslo Files on Defence and Security (December 2011). 
*Institutt for forsvarsstudier (IFS), available at:. http://brage.
bibsys.no/fhs/bitstream/URN:NBN:no­bibsys_brage_25791/4/
OF_7_2011ny.pdf
3ing must take place on Afghan premises. Pragmatism 
and flexibility were considered essential elements in 
mentoring, as the methodology and level of abstrac­
tion characteristic of Western military structures could 
not easily be transferred directly to the Afghan con­
text. In practice this often meant partnering with units 
on the basis of the principle of ‘learning by doing’. 
Importantly, and unlike the case with some other na­
tionalities, mentors from the Norwegian Army have, 
as of March 2012, never been attacked by their Afghan 
colleagues. However, several NATO soldiers were in­
jured in the protests that took place in the aftermath 
of the Koran­burning incident at the US military base 
in Bagram. In January 2012, two US soldiers were 
shot and killed inside the secure area of the Afghan 
Ministry of the Interior.8 As a result, all international 
personnel have temporarily been pulled out of Af­
ghan ministries, and the now­fragile relationship 
of trust between Afghan and international person­
nel may mean a lengthy halt to mentoring activities. 
The Afghan National Army – developments and  
challenges 
Fundamental challenges to achieving the objects 
and goals of the OMLT concept still remain. Impor­
tantly, the Afghan authorities and the ANSF have 
not agreed on a common political understanding 
of goals and ambitions. Whereas the dominant per­
ception among ANA officers is that the ANA should 
strive to become capable of resisting| a conventional 
external attack (most likely from neighboring Paki­
stan), counterinsurgency has been the top priority 
for NATO and the USA. Moreover, the ANA’s equip­
ment poses a challenge to the army’s capabilities for 
efficiently fighting the Taliban or other insurgency 
groups. According to the OMLT officers interviewed, 
the ANA is too heavily equipped today. It is forced to 
limit its operations to the road network – the ANA 
cannot follow the more lightly equipped and more 
flexible insurgents into rural areas. On the related 
issue of weapons, OMLT officers questioned the ap­
propriateness of replacing the ANA’s weapons with 
more advanced US models as part of a ‘one doctrine, 
one organization, one type of equipment’ strategy. 
The build­up of the ANA is taking place very rapid­
ly, with the USA in particular tending to emphasize 
quantity over quality. As a result, the CSCT­A and 
NTM­A have prematurely ‘checked out’ companies be­
fore they, in Norwegian eyes, were sufficiently consoli­
dated. Lack of previous schooling means that many 
recruits are unfamiliar with formal learning situa­
tions; further, they are often not sufficiently prepared 
for combat after only a short introductory period. 
ANA capacities are hampered by lack of resources, 
and absence without official leave (AWOL) is a wide­
spread problem.9 This also means that actual ANA 
capacity and size deviate greatly from official figures. 
Nevertheless, the interviewed OMLT officers con­
sidered the overall development of the 209th Corps 
elements under Norwegian tutelage to be fairly posi­
tive. Performance has varied according to the diffi­
culty of the operations it faces: when the 1st Kandak 
after only two periods of Norwegian support was 
ordered to Kandahar province in 2010, it sufered 
great losses, and a number of officers deserted. Nor­
wegian mentors had not partnered with the ANA in 
this particular operation, a decision which occasioned 
criticism from the OMLT officers we interviewed. 
Our interviewees also expressed considerable con­
cern about the longer­term financing of the security 
forces. The performance of the ANA is inseparably 
linked with the overarching state­building project un­
derway in Afghanistan. It is estimated that the stated 
goal of 200,000 soldiers and 150,000 police offic­
ers will cost between USD 4 and 8 billion per year, 
whereas the Afghan authorities are currently manag­
ing to collect only some USD 1 billion in tax revenues. 
This means that Afghanistan will remain heavily de­
pendent on foreign funding for many years to come. 
OMLT in Afghanistan – the way forward 
The gradual drawdown of regular combat troops from 
Afghanistan will have broader implications for men­
toring and partnering activities. Both reduced firepow­
er and access to sanitation, evacuation and intelligence 
support will directly and indirectly mean heightened 
risks for the OMLT contingents. We recommend that 
mentoring activities should be limited and trans­
formed in conjunction with the broader NATO draw­
down process. This could be done by gradually redi­
recting OMLT assistance away from operational work 
at company and battalion level and increasing the 
focus on the higher strategic levels within the ANA. 
In light of this situation, the statement made by De­
fense Minister Espen Barth Eide, on 5 December 
2011 that the Norwegian PRT contribution will be 
pulled out by 2013 and the remaining troop contri­
bution relocated to Mazar­e­Sharif, seems wise. If 
Afghanistan remains relatively stable and the ANA 
proves capable of countering the insurgency after 
the ISAF drawdown, the country will need to get a 
more traditional military training system in place. 
Norway should aim to contribute to such a process. 
Conceptual development and learning from experience
A series of long­term and unfinished military opera­
tions have left the West in a state of fatigue, making 
planned large­scale mentoring operations like that 
in Afghanistan unlikely for the foreseeable future. 
However, the possibility of military operations in­
volving allies cannot be ruled out, so Norway should 
consider establishing and maintaining a mechanism 
for preparing and deploying Norwegian personnel to 
military assistance programs. As a minimum, activi­
8 New York Times (20 January 2012). 2 U.S. Officers Slain; Advisers 
to Exit Kabul Ministries. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/
world/asia/afghanistan­koran­burning­protests­enter­fifth­day.
9 The latter was explained as a matter of ‘cultural diferences’ more 
than a problem related to discipline, and was not moralized over.
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ties should be maintained in the military training sys­
tem at the Norwegian War Academy and on staf level. 
As yet, experience and lessons learned from return­
ing personnel have not been gathered or utilized 
by the Ministry of Defense or the Norwegian Army 
in any organized or systematic fashion. This study 
finds that there is considerable potential for im­
proving mechanisms to facilitate such processes.
Assistance to the security sectors of other countries 
has become part of the foreign policy of more and 
more states, under the term ‘security sector reform’ 
(SSR). SSR is conceptually more focused on demo­
cratic oversight than the activities currently under­
way in Afghanistan, but in practice, both military/
practical skills and democratic oversight are essen­
tial to the quality of a country’s security institutions. 
Norway is internationally recognized as being in the 
forefront of SSR. For that reason, this study recom­
mends further independent research on how to ex­
tract lessons learned from the OMLT and broader 
SSR activities, so as to benefit future policymaking. 
Main findings and recommendations
Afghanistan has become an important part of the 
modern identity of the Norwegian Army, and any sud­
den halt to this engagement could put the rationale 
of this long term engagement into question. We see 
potential gains for the Norwegian Army in follow­
ing the development of the ANA on a longer­term 
basis. Such prolonged participation could also pro­
vide security­policy advantages for Norway, should 
other allies decide to continue their involvement. 
The OMLT officers interviewed for this study have 
evaluated the experiences from mentoring and 
partnering activities in Afghanistan as generally 
positive, both as to the quality of the ANA units 
under their tutelage as well as regards the situa­
tion for themselves personally and professionally. 
Recommendations:
I) We recommend that the Norwegian govern­
ment continue its OMLT commitment through­
out the period of regular military presence. In 
conjunction with the broader NATO drawdown, 
units should gradually be transformed and orient­
ed towards the higher strategic level of the ANA. 
II) We recommend that consideration be given to 
prolonged collaboration with the ANA beyond 2014. 
The Ministry of Defense and the Norwegian Army 
should investigate the possibility of engaging in pro­
grams directed at improving the military training 
system in Afghanistan. This study, as well as others, 
has noted the strength of the ‘Norwegian method’ in 
mentoring activities – a relatively non­hierarchical 
structure, pragmatism and ‘learning by doing’ in 
line with local0 premises. Moreover, although risks 
are increasing, deployment to positions for mentor­
ing and ‘training the trainers’ is still likely to be as­
sociated with least hazard for Norwegian person­
nel in future military engagement in Afghanistan.
III) Knowledge and experience from returning 
personnel are not being gathered or utilized by 
the Norwegian Army or the Ministry of Defense 
in any organized or systematic fashion. There 
is considerable potential for improvement here. 
IV) The Norwegian government should give consid­
eration to the possibility of coordinating the eforts 
and expertise­building of the Ministries of Foreign 
Afairs, of Defense and of Justice, to create synergy 
efects between projects and programs undertaken 
in SSR assistance in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
Here the various external Norwegian research com­
munities have much to ofer in such a process.
